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Abstract 
The distinction between internalism and externalism can be interpreted in different ways, which 
must be kept clearly distinct. The distinction between internal and external reasons for action, 
proposed by Bernard Williams (1980), can be interpreted as expressing a form of internalism. If 
we assume that internalism seems preferable to externalism and Williams’s "internal reason 
theorist" as an internalist, we have an example of an anti-rationalistic form of internalism. I will 
suggest that Williams’s arguments do not justify his distinction and the consequences he draws, 
basically because of the unjustified exclusion of rational elements from the "subjective 
motivational set". Moreover, Williams’s position seems exposed to a subjectivistic outcome 
which he himself probably would wish to avoid. Therefore, I argue that the distinction between 
internal and external reasons should be abandoned. Some considerations in favour of a 
rationalistic interpretation of internalism and of the normativity of moral reasons are then 
suggested. 
  
  
1. The distinction between internalism and externalism in the theory of motivation, 
though indeed useful, stands in need of some clarification. Since it was first 
formulated (Falk 1947-48; Frankena 1958), it has acquired a number of similar but 
not identical meanings, and parallel distinctions have been introduced (e.g. internal 
and external reasons; see Williams 1980), generating some confusion in the debate.  
 This distinction responds to an important need both in the theory of 
motivation and in the theory of practical reason, namely the need to express the 
relation between the explicative and the normative value of practical judgments. 
The issue can be expressed in the question whether a moral motivation (our alleged 
motive when we claim to be "acting for a moral reason") can be said to give both 
an explication and a justification for an action deriving from a practical 
deliberation. If moral reasons do not explicate nor justify the action chosen on their 
grounds, then morality seems to be a mistification, since moral reasons are 
normally intended by the agent to offer the key to the understanding of the agent’s 
choices, in terms both of causes and of arguments sustaining the choice. The 
connection between explication and normativity is spelled out differently in the 
various theories of practical reason, and the possibility of a convincing normative 
ethical theory rests considerably on the viability of that connection.  
2. In a general sense, the distinction between internalism and externalism tries to 
sort out the characteristic features of two meanings of the notion of "ought" or 
"obligation" in the moral language; these two meanings express two opposite 
views of the connection between moral obligation and motivation, so that, 
according to an internalist reading, motivation is internal to the notion of a moral 
"ought", while on an externalist view motivation is external to it. Yet, this broad 
distinction has been drawn and used in at least three distinct but partially 
overlapping ways.  
 In a first sense, suggested by Falk (1947-48), the issue appears to be whether 
moral motivation is internal or external to the subject, in a broad and unspecified 
understanding of the word "subject"; in this perspective, the internalist 
interpretation maintains that a moral "ought" has a "motivational" sense which is 
internal to the subject and "bears at least a sufficient resemblance to what ordinary 
usage expects of a normative term" (Falk 1947-48, p. 36); moral obligations are 
"conclusive reasons" which operate as "a dictate of conscience" (p. 40). Internalists 
in this sense contend that motivation is to be found within the acting subject 
whenever she honestly declares to be acting from an "ought" whose normative 
force she recognized in certain circumstances. 
 In a second sense, implicitly endorsed by Frankena (1958), internalism 
entails the claim that the very concept of moral obligation logically implies 
motivation, while externalism argues (as Frankena himself does) for a logical gap 
between them. In this sense, the distinction refers to the concept of "ought" and 
neither directly nor necessarily to the acting subject. For an internalist in this sense, 
an obligation is essentially motivating, that is, it cannot be present without 
motivating. Now, as critics of internalism have often noted, this claim seems too 
strong, because, without further clarification, it cannot explain such phenomena as 
weakness of will and accidie: in these situations, the actual perception of an 
obligation does not entail the presence of a corresponding motivation. Therefore, in 
these cases, the concept of an obligation, or even the acceptance of its normative 
power, cannot serve as an explanation of the actual agent’s choices and we lose the 
possibility of sistematically connecting the normative and explicative value of 
moral reasons through the mere notion of an "ought". Furthermore, as Frankena 
notes, on this account we may be tempted to change the notion of obligation, 
making it dependent on the existing motivations of the subject. "Internalism, 
Frankena says, in building in motivation, runs the [...] risk of having to trim 
obligation to the size of individual motives": if motivation needs to be inscribed in 
the notion of a moral "ought", we might have to recognize as real "oughts" only 
those which are actually matched by a corresponding motivation; this would entail 
"trimming" the notion of obligation to the actual size of the subject’s interests. This 
objection amounts to a charge of subjectivism. This charge probably works even 
better against internalism in the first sense of the distinction: if the motivational 
sense of "ought" is internal to the subject, and only this sense is normative, then 
normativity does indeed depend on the subject’s actual motivations. Although this 
is not what Falk intended (as we have seen, he would substitute "dictates of 
conscience" for motivations), that is indeed a possible interpretation of an 
internalist position, as we will see. 
 In a third sense, specified by Jonathan Dancy (1993), internalism and 
externalism oppose each other on whether moral reasons are intrinsically (but not 
essentially) motivating: that is, on whether, when they do motivate at all, they do it 
in their own right or not. In this sense, a moral reason might be present without 
motivating, but when it does it does not need the external sanction of a desire. 
Moral reasons do have a motivating power, but they do not need to exercise it 
whenever they are present. Separating the motivating power of moral reasons from 
its actual exercise might avoid the risk of subjectivism for internalism, but only if 
we explain what normativity amounts to in this kind of interpretation. This line of 
thought needs to be explored more carefully. 
3. The third sense of the distinction excludes the second, although it moves the 
distinction away from the semantic level of discourse toward a broadly 
epistemological one: moral reasons ("oughts" and obligations) are not essentially 
motivating qua concepts, but they are a kind of cognitive contents that are able to 
motivate. The first sense is compatible with the third, but it is extremely 
ambiguous, since "internal/external to the subject" can be interpreted in various 
ways. One way of interpreting it is to use an altogether different distinction, 
proposed by Bernard Williams (1980), according to which reasons are, 
respectively, internal or external to the "subjective motivational set of the agent". 
This motivational set (which Williams identifies with the agent’s "character") is 
something different from what Falk called "conscience": while Falk clearly 
endorsed a conception of conscience as the locus of evidence of moral concepts 
and principles (in terms of obligations), Williams starkly rejects the picture of 
morality centered on the notion of obligation and indeed refuses the notion of 
moral conscience as the voice of impersonal requirements concerning conduct. 
Furthermore, Falk and Williams faced two completely different questions: while 
Falk asked himself whether there existed a meaning of "ought" which implied 
motivation, Williams asked what kind of reasons for action there are, so that if 
there is only one kind of reasons (e.g. internal ones), then, if obligations exist at all, 
they must be reasons of that kind (e.g. internal reasons). On the other hand, both 
distinctions use the idea of "subject" as their turning point, aiming at tracing both 
the explicative and the normative character of moral reasons back to the same 
source, i.e. the capacity of the acting subject to motivate himself. Thus, the 
distinction between internal and external reasons does have some connection with 
the distinction between internalism and externalism in the first sense, but, at the 
same time, it must be kept clearly distinct from it: they are both centered on a 
broadly "anthropological" perspective, but they ask different questions and use 
different characterizations of the agent. 
4. Internalism seems to be predominant in the recent debate, owing to some faults 
of externalism that have been repeatedly pointed out (e.g. Smith, 1994). First, 
externalism has difficulties in explaining in which sense a moral reason can be 
normative for a particular subject: if moral judgments are requirements of a 
rationality which is separated from the subject, then their normativity is the same 
as that of a state law which is imposed on the individual and which is effective 
only so far as it is enforced by sanctions. Morality in this perspective is an 
alienating force; blame would have a sanctionary role for morality, as that of 
penalties in the legal system, and the normative force for the subject would depend 
on an identification with the (external) point of view of morality. This picture of 
morality is not very attractive and seems to open the way to a dissociation of the 
agent from her deeds. Second, externalism cannot explain the practicality of 
practical reason, i.e. its action-guiding power: if externalism is true, then we never 
truly act for moral reasons, but always for some interest which can happen to 
coexist with a moral reason and so make it effective in the agent’s choice. If 
normativity is defined not only by the critical distance of normative reasons from 
the arbitrariness of the individual point of view but also by their action-guiding 
power, that is, their ability to issue in the agent’s choice and action, then 
externalism must deny that moral reasons as such can ever be normative in a full 
sense. Thus, on an externalist perspective it is extremely difficult to make sense of 
the common experience that we do sometimes act for moral reasons; an externalist 
should claim that in those cases, in fact, we act for some other unspoken non-moral 
reasons, because it becomes immediately evident that, thus, action can never be 
influenced by moral reasons and that reasons for action stem from other sources 
(Mackie 1977). Pradoxically enough, it seems hard, at this point, to deny that these 
other forces can be anything different from individual interests or dispositions 
(even if these are inculcated by social and educational forces), so that externalism 
seems to be converted into a form of "internal reasons theory" in the sense 
proposed by Williams: the "real" reasons for action are "internal" to the subject 
because they derive from his interests, although they are of a different kind from 
the alleged "moral" reasons. On this account, moral reasons do not motivate as 
"moral" ones, but as self-centered or socially conditioned reasons in disguise. But 
then, why not saying that "moral" reasons themselves motivate us? Externalists of 
this kind would like to avoid this outcome because they tend to reject morality as 
an external source of motivation, as opposed to the real, internal, force of self-
interest. Then, the point is the conception of the nature of morality: what if we 
assume that its source is whithin the subject, on a par with self interest? 
 On the contrary, internalism can make sense of the action-guiding power of 
moral reasons and, at the same time, it seems able to overcome the difficulties 
posed to it by the amoralist, by the analogy of moral requirements with the 
requirements of etiquette (Smith, 1994) and by the problems of weakness of will 
and of accidie (Dancy, 1993) (1). The problems for internalism result rather from 
the difficulties in making sense of the critical stance of normative reasons (of 
normativity in general) with respect to the particularity of individual interests. The 
normative claim seems to be intrinsically connected with a claim that the agent 
who feels a moral obligation, recognizes that he is required (and not just factually 
or psychologically compelled) to act in a certain way, and is therefore justified to 
act in that way. Traditionally, this justification has been understood in terms of 
rationality of the normative claim, so that moral reasons have been interpreted as 
requirements of rationality in its practical dimension (Korsgaard 1986; Smith 
1994). 
 I will now address Williams’s distinction between internal and external 
reasons in detail, since it expresses a point of view which tries to use a form of 
internalism in order to subvert the traditional intepretation of moral reasons as 
requirements of rationality. I will suggest that the distinction is misleading as an 
interpretation of the process of deliberation and that therefore it should be 
abandoned: even in the context of Williams’s approach, the distinction does not 
seem to suggest a better model for the interpretation of the interplay of reason and 
desire in the ethical life; on the contrary, a critique of the role of moral theories and 
morality (in Williams’s sense) should rather suggest a deeper and more original 
connection between desire and reason than that imposed by the distinction. At the 
same time, I will suggest that Williams’s position shows a possible 
misinterpretation of the internalism requirement; Williams’s account, while 
offering an explanation of the action-guiding power of reasons for action, fails to 
allow for the critical stance of normativity, thus resulting in a form of 
subjectivism.  
5. Internal and external reasons express two possible interpretations of statements 
of the form "A has a reason to ? " . The internal reason theorist holds that "having 
a reason to ? " means having found, through a "sound deliberative route", that ? is 
a way to realize one or more goals included in one or more elements in the 
subject’s motivational set. According to Williams, such a description of the 
deliberative process is motivated by the aim of not separating explanatory and 
normative reasons: if A has a reason to ? , that must mean that we can give an 
explanation of his behaviour in terms of his practical deliberation (given his 
motivational set) and, at the same time, that, given his motivational set and a sound 
deliberative route, A should ? , that is, the deliberation has normative force for A. 
As a consequence, the process of practical deliberation, on this account, can be 
wrong only if there are errors concerning facts (false beliefs) relevant to the 
reasoning or mistakes in the logical steps of the reasoning itself; practical 
deliberation cannot be wrong simply because it does not comply with the 
requirements of a set of norms or obligations: noncompliance with moral 
obligations is not a case of irrationality. In this perspective, practical reason works 
from within the subjective motivational set. 
 The external reason theorist, on the contrary, would maintain that reasons 
deriving from outside the subject’s motivational set (e.g. a set of moral imperatives 
or categorically binding principles), and therefore not corresponding to any one of 
the elements of the motivational set (the subject’s desires), can motivate the 
subject’s action; such reasons may not serve as an explanation of the subject’s 
performing a certain action but only in this way can they have normative force. 
The external reason theorist seeks to avoid the risk of subjectivism and to preserve 
a claim of universalizability in the process of practical deliberation, through an 
appeal to universally binding principles grounded in the structure of practical 
reason and independent from the subject’s desires.  
 It is usually believed that the latter perspective resembles closely the view of 
Kant (and of many recent Kantian approaches, although both attributions should be 
questioned on a closer scrutiny). Roughly Kantian is the scope of distinguishing 
the realm of morality, whose normative force is said to depend on reason alone, 
from the subject’s desires and emotions, in order to grant the autonomy of practical 
reason. Yet, this requires some qualifications. Kant’s notion of autonomy is 
intended mainly to secure a place for the will as distinct from the world of 
phenomena, which is held by determinism; the Kantian idea of autonomy of the 
will implies that the normative force of a deliberation for the subject lies in his 
will, as an expression of his practical reason; free action takes place when the will 
is a law to itself, having excluded any heteronomous influence. In this sense, moral 
reasons for Kant are internal reasons, although obviously not internal to the 
"subjective motivational set". In a Kantian perspective, it is rather desires that are 
"external" to the source of moral action. On the other hand, it is also often 
remarked that Kant’s interpretation of desires and emotions is in general rather 
reductive, suggesting that desire is systematically misleading as a motivation for 
action and separating rather rigidly reason from desire in the deliberative process. 
Thus, in many cases, Kant’s account fails to serve as an explanation of the 
subject’s behaviour (e.g. in the cases of weakness of will). It must be remember, 
anyway, that clearly Kant’s aim is only to illustrate the foundations of the 
normative claim of practical reason and not to explain the psychology of individual 
action: this latter work is not a goal of the critique of practical reason, but rather 
the task of a pragmatic anthropology (cf. Louden 1992).  
 The internal reasons approach has been labelled Humean, or rather "sub-
Humean", since Hume’s view on the matter is said to be more complex than this 
Williams 1980), and it also presupposes a drastic opposition between desire and 
reason, an opposition clearly derived from Hobbes. The idea is that the subject’s 
desires and interests are the only motivational force behind his deliberations and 
that reason can only intervene as a corrective concerning facts pertinent to the 
action or errors in the deliberative route. Williams rightly observes that the process 
of deliberation is richer and more articulate than just defining means to an end, as 
it also entails, for example, finding a specific form for a project or retrieving 
similarities and differences between situations (Wiggins, 1976; Williams, 1989), 
but he maintains that this does not substantially alter the internal reasons picture 
and its plausibility. In Williams’s words: "there is an essential indeterminacy in 
what can be counted a rational deliberative process" (1980, p. 110), but in any case 
the origin of that process must be traced back to the subject’s existing motivations.  
 Williams argues that there can be no external reasons in a real deliberative 
process. In particular, the claims of morality (2) as an external source of motivation 
for the subject should be dismissed, since they cannot be effective, being unable to 
reach the subject’s motivational set, and therefore they do not have a real 
normative force, since the latter derives from the connection of a rational 
consideration with the subject’s desires. Thus, statements indicating external 
reasons for action, if considered separately in themselves, are either false or 
incoherent or yet the misleading expression of something else.  
 Here, the basic presupposition is that the normative force of a deliberation 
can only lay within the subjective motivational set. We should note that Williams’s 
perspective emphasizes one of the features of the notion of normativity, that is, the 
action-guiding character of reasons for action, at the expenses of another, that is, 
the critical stance of reasons with respect to the arbitrariness of the subject’s 
desires. In this perspective, the possibility of a critical evaluation of some basic 
elements in the subjective motivational set seems to be rather limited. Although 
Williams admits that some elements in it can be changed, it seems that the 
fundamental interests are given in advance for each individual, as if they were 
already there, and already quite individualized, before the deliberation takes place. 
In fact, Williams is very liberal as to what is included in the motivational set of an 
agent, so that it comprises "dispositions of evaluation, patterns of emotional 
reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects, as they might be called, 
embodying commitments of the agent" (1980, p. 105). Anyway, the elements in the 
motivational set are described as if they can only be of a non-rational kind, since 
reason intervenes only as the faculty that elaborates on the ways to bring a given 
motivation to effect into or through an action. The requirements of rationality seem 
to be conceived of as originally external to the subject, so that the subject’s 
motivational set stands alone, waiting for reason to show how to become effective 
and perform the adequate actions in order to satisfy desires.  
 Williams admits for the possibility that a rational argument could make the 
subject realize that he has a reason to do something he did not know he had reason 
to do before the deliberation took place. This means that the deliberation can reveal 
the subject something concerning the connection between his desires and the 
proposed action. It is doubtful whether such a revision of one or more elements in 
the motivational set might also tell the subject something concerning himself, that 
is, that he had better not have certain desires or motivations because, for example, 
they do not harmonize well with other desires or beliefs he already has; or even, 
that certain desires are incompatible with a claim of reason that he, as a rational 
agent, could not disregard without contradiction. Here the problem, for the agent 
himself, is that of the ultimate justification of his actions not just as expressions of 
his desires but as ways to realize his ethical life. As Michael Smith puts it: "[B]y 
far the most important way in which we create new and destroy old underived 
desires when we deliberate is by trying to find out whether our desires are 
systematically justifiable" (Smith 1994, pp. 158-159). 
 Tehere seems to be a problem with Williams’s account of the subject’s 
character as identical with his "subjective motivational set". We should take into 
consideration a different account of the idea of the character of a subject: character 
could be the result of a variety of forces, among which rational considerations, first 
suggested by education and existing practices, then interiorized as the intention to 
behave rationally - that is, consistently, play a decisive role from the very 
beginning; on such a view, a claim of rational consistency is, so to say, originally 
built into the subject’s character. In this perspective, the internal reasons account of 
deliberation might still be true, and better suited than the one in terms of external 
reasons, but the notion of a "subject’s motivational set" should be radically 
reformulated, since it should include a substantial requirement of rationality which 
Williams’s account seem to exclude. But at this point, it is clear that a Humean 
conception of practical rationality would not be enough to respond to the demand 
for normativity, since it conceives of practical rationality in an exclusively 
instrumental way (notwithstanding the role of imagination, which in any case is to 
serve an end posited by desire). This account excludes in a crucial way the 
possibility that reason play a role in assessing the rationality of our deliberations in 
terms of rational justification, for example in the sense of a more unified set of 
desires (which can be seen as a virtue; Smith 1994, p. 159) (3). 
6. Christine M. Korsgaard (1986) has recalled that the basic assumption behind the 
internal reason theorist’s position is the conclusion drawn by Hume in the Treatise 
of Human Nature that "reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, 
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them" (1888, p. 
415). Korsgaard argues that Humean skepticism concerning the motivating power 
of reason (motivational skepticism) depends on a more general skepticism 
concerning the powers of reason (content skepticism); Williams’s argument seems 
to hold only to motivational skepticism, being otherwise less skeptical concerning 
the powers of reason in general (for example as regards the possibility of objective 
scientific knowledge - see Williams 1985). Anyway, the point is that internal 
reasons can motivate only because they spring from the motives one already has in 
his motivational set, and that any route from an element in it to an action, if 
"sound", constitutes a deliberation, although it can be not only of the means/end 
kind.  
 An important question, partially hidden by the way the argument goes, is 
whether reason has any kind of influence in the formation of these elements of the 
motivational set or not; if it has, the claim that practical reason cannot motivate 
should be seriously questioned, because it would be extremely difficult to separate 
the "pure" elements in the motivational set on one side and "pure" practical reason 
on the other. The interplay of rational considerations and desires in the original 
constitution of such complex elements must be very strict: dispositions of 
evaluation, patterns of emotional reaction and personal loyalties can only be 
understood as the result of the influence of experience, mediated by rationality, by 
the received morality and even by moral theories, on the formation of the subject’s 
desires and motives; during the educational process, these forces shape what is an 
otherwise indetermined and incoherent tension towards any object encountered in 
the world (i.e. desire in its original form). It is clear that practical reason has a 
decisive role at least in shaping the character of a person and that one need not 
think of rational considerations coming only after the desires have been 
established. Furthermore, the width of the existing desires in the motivational set, 
in Williams’s undestanding, is so great that it is hard to think that any moral theory 
would be left out of it. Given this indeterminacy of the motivational set and the 
indeterminacy of the deliberative process according to Williams, we are led to the 
conclusion that either pure practical reason does not exist, or any route from desire 
to action constitutes deliberation, without being able to give any reasonable sense 
to the idea of "a sound deliberative route". 
 Anyway, the result of Williams’s argument is not to demonstrate that there 
are no conclusions of practical reason that serve as motives to the rational agent, 
since this is one of his presuppositions; as it is just another presupposition, one the 
external reason theorist would simply refuse to accept, that the deliberative process 
must start from the subject’s present motivations rather than from some objective 
values or requirements (Hooker, 1987). 
7.  Finally, the internal reasons approach has difficulties in defining an 
intelligible sense for the notion of normative force. In which sense are moral 
reasons normative if only internal reasons have normative force? What is 
normative for practical reason in such an account, other than the motivating power 
of desire? It might be true that the motivational source lies in the desiring structure 
of the individual subject, but does not the claim to be normative implicitly go 
beyond the actual motivational set of the subject? Should we not distinguish 
between motivational and normative force? 
 Williams is willing to concede this point, as he says that "‘A has a reason to 
? ‘ means more than ‘A is presently disposed to ? ‘" (1989, p. 36); yet, in his 
perspective, this means only that deliberation can correct errors of fact and 
reasoning involved in the agent’s view of the matter; is this really enough to say 
that it has normative force? Williams says it is not necessary to write the 
requirements of prudence and morality into the notion of a sound deliberative 
route, and he may be right on his account of what morality and prudence are (that 
is, a system of external obligations); but if we inscribe into the notion of 
deliberation the responsibility for one’s own character (and I think that Williams 
himself would accept this inclusion) we would have to write into it a critical stance 
that makes the subject capable of responding to reasons appropriately, modifying 
his desires according to some requirements of reason and of the situation. If the 
subject’s character were constituted solely of his present motivations (however 
widely these are conceived of), and if he could not transcend his actual set by 
appeal, for example, to notions of consistency, coherence, integrity or dignity, how 
could he ever be responsible for something (his own character) over which he has 
no control? 
 Therefore, we need a different account of the idea that moral reasons should 
have normative force. The need for normativity is probably best understood as the 
need for being able to build one’s motivational structure so that other rational 
agents can recognize my desires as rationally justifiable, and therefore recognize 
me as a rational agent, even if only to criticize me. In other words, normativity 
seems to be connected with the need for recognition by others, which requires the 
possibility that my desires take a recognizable and communicable form - one that 
can claim some form of universalizability in the sense of intelligibility and 
appreciability by another agent, i.e. they must be at least in principle rationally 
approvable or disapprovable by another. On such a view, the normative claim is 
inscribed in the structure of action as the expression of the agent’s desire to act in a 
way comprehensible and potentially acceptable by other rational agents, so that 
they can respond to it (4). The appeal to this kind of reasons should not make one 
think of "external" reasons at all: the agent is a whole whose "motivational set" - or 
rather, I would say, his will - includes a claim for rationality which cannot be 
totally isolated from desires, as well as his desires cannot be totally isolated from 
reason. It is true that "it is often vague what one has reason to do" (Williams, 1989, 
p. 38), but this does not necessarily mean that we should exclude the possibility 
that the deliberative process might bring some clarity through the recognition of 
some unconditional principles discovered inside the structure of rational action, 
where the notion of action obviously includes intention and therefore motivations, 
desires and so on. 
8. A similar way of criticizing this view is the charge of "psychologism", raised 
against Williams by John McDowell (1995). This is the charge that the internal 
reasons model does not allow any critical distance between the merely empirical 
aspects of individual psychology (how my reasoning actually goes given that I was 
brought up as I was and therefore have these interests) and a notion of practical 
rationality independent enough from the subject to make critical assessment (by the 
subject himself) possible. As well known, in his famous attack against 
psychologism, Frege argued for a difference between the principles of logic as 
‘laws of truth’ and the psychological ‘laws of thought’. A similar difference is 
defended by McDowell: "The critical dimension of the notion of practical 
rationality requires an analogous transcendence of the mere facts of individual 
psychology" (1995, p. 77). This means, in turn, that practical rationality should not 
be conceived of as content-neutral, if it has to be really critical of the subject’s 
motivations; we may recognize substantive reasons in the deliberative process 
which can help the subject structurate his motivational set and make rational 
choices. 
 The explanation of an action should serve to make it rationally intelligible to 
rational agents, and if we can say (and I maintain that we can) that the aspiration to 
have intelligible desires is a structural feature of any rational agent, then the claims 
of rationality (formal consistency and content-non-neutrality or truth claim - that 
is, formal and substantive claims) can play the role of giving the required 
normative force to propositions of the form "A has a reason to ? ". This is not just 
to relate types of actions to types of circumstances, as opposed to relating actions 
to persons, as Williams (1995) replies to roughly similar suggestions by 
McDowell, but only to show that the agent has an intrinsic need, in order to 
express his desires in his actions, to transcend his motivational set and make a 
rationality claim in front of other possible rational agents, from whom he expects 
recognition. On this view, it is possible to say something which is distinctively 
about the subject and his motivational set, which is the internal reason theorist 
requirement, and so to relate the normative force of practical deliberation directly 
with the subject and not just with some external reasons or some formal 
requirement of abstract reasoning. 
9. On the whole, therefore, the distinction between internal and external reasons is 
misleading and, in order to give an adequate account of rational deliberation, it 
seems that we should abandon it; in fact, it separates from the very beginning what 
actually are aspects of the same process, in which the interplay of desire and reason 
is more original and intrinsic than the distinction allows. Opposing internal and 
external reasons for action is just one way to focus attention on the requirement 
that morality not be conceived of like an external and extrinsic constraint on the 
subject’s will. This is the claim that morality, if it exists in its own right and not as 
the projection of something different (e.g. a cognitive error; cfr. Mackie, 1977), is 
autonomous, that is, it depends on a demand of the subject and takes its authority 
from a structural dimension of the subject himself. In this sense, Williams’s 
argument that there are only internal reasons for action simply supports the idea 
that morality, if taken right, has to be conceived of as autonomous. The problem 
with Williams’s argument is that it postulates an entity, the "subjective 
motivational set", which does not exist as a dimension completely severed from 
rationality; furthermore, this postulation gives the argument a largely Humean 
appearance which is extremely misleading. If only internal reasons exist, then 
either morality does not exist per se (that is, it is a mistification) or it is internal as 
well; Williams wants to suggest that a morality conceived of as a system of 
external reasons is a mistification, but this does not rule out the possibility that a 
correct view of morality sees it as internal to the subject, though not to his 
"motivational set". But once the notion of such a set evaporates, what we have is 
exactly the Kantian claim of the autonomy of practical reason. The real issue at 
stake here is whether the internal character of morality necessarily entails a 
subjectivistic conclusion concerning the normativity claim of moral judgments, and 
in general of practical reasoning; this is a consequence Williams did not 
demonstrate and which probably, given his own defusing strategy toward 
subjectivism (Williams, 1972), he would try to avoid as well. 
10. In a subjectivistic interpretation, normativity can only mean that an individual 
might feel an idiosincratic imperative to perform some act. This is contrary to the 
common experience that some of our actions implicitly express our intention to do 
something which we believe to be what we should do in a certain situation. My 
choice for action expresses a desiderative reason or a ratiocinative desire that 
claims to be respondent to the requirements of the recognizable features of the 
circumstances. If I choose to be the person who performs a certain act in certain 
circumstances, I am expressing my belief that being such a kind of person can be 
good for me as a rational person among others (5). 
 This will to believe in our moral judgments has some important 
implications: first, we are interested in that our moral judgments be true, at least 
for ourselves, i.e., we do want to respond adequately to the situation; second, this 
implies that we want our moral judgments to be virtually intelligible for other 
rational agents; third, we want other rational agents to recognize that the action we 
chose, although it might not be the only one required by the situation, does respond 
adequately to it, i.e. that our judgements are intersubjectively true, although there 
can be more than one way to respond adequately to the situation. This amounts to a 
universalizability claim: a rational agent like me in the relevant circumstances 
ought to share the same reasons for action as mine and accept my action as a 
consistent expression of those reasons, although he might choose a different course 
or style of action. There is not only one course of action which is justifiable (apart 
very exceptional cases) but there are courses of action which are certainly 
unjustifiable as a rational response to the situation, because no rational agent would 
accept their premises and/or the modes of their performance as expressions of 
rational moral judgments. The ultimate foundation of this claim is the idea that a 
rational agent cannot exist as such (i.e. cannot ultimately be rational) without 
confronting himself with another subject which he recognizes as another rational 
agent (Ricoeur 1990). 
 The normativity of moral reasons results from the sustainability of this 
claim: if the proposed reasons for action can be shown to be consistent with the 
notion of a rational agent among others and with the (morally relevant) features of 
the situation as seen by a competent agent, then the agent is justified in his choice; 
those reasons can be sustained by both beliefs and desires, granted that they are 
both open on the world. The rationality claim of moral judgments is not only a 
matter of systematic justifiability (Smith 1994; he talks of "convergence at the 
level of hypothetical desires of fully rational agents"), which is only a formal 
requirement, but also a claim of substantive rationality, if you wish a substantive 
truth claim (a kind of convergence at the level of hypothetical reasons of fully 
rational agents; hypothetical desires are the desires of a subject which can survive a 
rational critique). This has two senses: i) a judgment is true if it is ultimately 
justifiable, that is, justifiable with respect to some ultimate demands of rationality 
in practical issues (such as unconditioned principles of practical reason); and ii) a 
judgment is true if it does respond adequately to the features of the situation, that 
is, if it fits most reasonably in them, so far as they can be reasonably known by the 
agent. The universalizability claim is thus connected with a "respondence-to-the-
world" claim: a claim for formal justification, in terms of a unified set of desires 
and of consistence with categorical requirements of reason, goes together with a 
claim for substantive justification, in terms of a rationally adequate respondence to 
the situation of the action judged to be done. 
  
11. Within such a framework, moral reasons are internal in the first and third sense 
of the distinction, although the picture that was painted in the background has 
radically changed. Problems of weakness of the will and the like may still raise 
(although Dancy’s arguments seem to hold), but at least the risk of subjectivism, 
and the corresponding lack of normativity, can be avoided. It is important to note 
that, although I have stressed the substantive claim, it is only the formal one which 
offers a ground for the normativity of moral reasons; they are normative insofar as 
they can sustain the formal requirement of universalizability for any rational agent, 
while at the same time facing particular circustances. 
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back 
(1) A possible line of argument here is that a true amoralist cannot exist: living 
without commitment to any form of communicative relationship with other human 
beings is practically impossible and, at the same time, any form of communicative 
discourse (apart from violence) implies the willingness to engage in argumentation. 
This is already a moral commitment. back 
(2) Williams gives the expression "morality" a specific meaning, basically 
connected with the idea of obligation and/or duty; the system of morality is the 
system of moral beliefs, typical of Western modern culture, based on a limited 
number of imperatives especially concerning our relationships with other human 
beings. See Williams, 1985. back 
(3) Thus, Williams is committed to a relativistic conception of normative reasons, 
as Smith again suggests: "Williams’s Humean view is thus in opposition to the 
anti-Humean or Kantian view that under conditions of full rationality we would all 
reason ourselves towards the same conclusions as regards what is to be done; in 
opposition to the view that via a process of systematic justification of our desires 
we could bring it about that we converge in the desires that we have" (Smith 1994, 
pp. 165-166). back 
(4) Of course it is not actually necessary that for this reason every action must be 
performed in the presence of others; actions can be expressive even if done alone. 
Yet, a whole life with no connection with other rational agents (not even hoped for, 
or expected posthumously, or just dreamed of) would be unbearable for a human 
being. back 
(5) Cf. Nagel 1970, 1986; Smith 1994, p. 176 expresses a roughly similar view; a 
possible point of departure are our considered judgments. back 
